Call me a
gloomy hawk. It's not just that I'm a hawk who's disappointed with the course of
fighting in the Middle East. My concern is that our underlying foreign-policy
dilemma calls for both hawkishness and gloom - and will for some time. The two
worst-case scenarios are world-war abroad and nuclear terror at home. I fear
we're on a slow-motion track to both.
No, I don't think our venture in
Iraq has gotten us into this mess. I think this mess has gotten us into Iraq.
And the mess will not go away, whatever we do. Our Islamist enemy has proven
himself implacable - unwilling to relent in the face of either dovish or hawkish
policies. That means we're facing years - maybe decades - of inconclusive,
on/off (mostly on) hot war, unless and until a nuclear terror strike, a major
case of nuclear blackmail, or a nuclear clash among Middle Eastern states ushers
in a radical new phase.
Castro
Let's take a moment to think
about Castro. Castro is the master and pioneer of ornery third-world defiance.
We need to appreciate the immensity of Castro's achievement in preserving Cuba's
Communist dictatorship for 17 years after the collapse of his chief patron, the
Soviet Union. It's remarkable that, absent any great-power protection, and even
after becoming, without Soviet subsidies, a permanent economic basket-case,
Castro's regime has not collapsed.
Let that be a lesson to those who wait
for the collapse of regimes in Iran, North Korea, or Palestine because of
long-term economic failure and/or economic sanctions. Yes, popular uprisings
happen (as in Iran against the Shah). Yet it's also clear that a posture of
anti-Western defiance, combined with nationalism, ideology, and dictatorial rule
is perfectly capable of sustaining a miserable, poverty-stricken, failed system
far, far beyond the point that Westerners would consider tolerable or
believable.
If you are willing to kill yourself - if you are willing even
to impoverish, immiserate, and let die much of your country, you can accomplish
a great deal. Hezbollah's gains in its war with Israel stem from its ability to
define success as mere survival, even as the country around it is destroyed.
This is no mere clever public-relations spin, but the reflection of a profound
reality: the growing independence of terrorist organizations from states, and
the willingness of Islamist terrorists to sacrifice all in pursuit of
fundamentally non-material goals. With military success (accurately) framed as
the near-complete destruction of terrorist forces, decisive military victory is
virtually defined out of existence.
Democracy?
This is why the
United States has turned to democratization. The stick of military force
combined with the carrot of democracy was supposed to have provided a way out.
Unfortunately, democratization of fundamentally illiberal societies cannot
happen quickly. Real democratization requires a great deal of time and deep,
painful, expensive underlying cultural change, almost impossible to bring about
without an effectively permanent military occupation.
Even a long-term
military occupation cannot promote democratization in the absence of social
peace. The Iraqi resistance's greatest victory came with the very start of their
campaign. By creating sufficient insecurity to bar Western civilians from Iraq,
the real key to democratic change was blocked from the start. If advising an
Iraqi bureaucrat, working with an Iraqi entrepreneur, or teaching at an Iraqi
college had become career-making occupations for an ambitious generation of
young American civilians, we might have had a chance to build genuine democracy
in Iraq. Once the rebellion made that sort of cultural exchange impossible, the
democratization project was cut off before it could begin.
I've made
these points about the problems of democratization since before the invasion of
Iraq (See my "After the
War" and "Democratic
Imperialism.") In those pieces, I even "predicted" the sort of trouble we're
seeing now. Yet, despite that gloom, I was, and remain, a hawk. I am hawk
because I believe that the danger of nuclear terror and nuclear blackmail remain
real, and because I am convinced that negotiations from weakness, grand
bargains, and unilateral retreats are powerless to defuse these threats. In
short, I am a gloomy hawk because I believe that neither hawks nor doves have
any viable near-term solutions to the problem we now face.
Technology
Globalization, economic advance,
and technology are at the root of our dilemma. It is remarkable that 9/11 meant
more civilian casualties from a foreign foe than this country had ever
experienced at a blow. Without the movement of Middle Easterners to Europe (to
learn our languages, take our classes, etc.), without our modern mastery of
building technology and air travel, 9/11 could not have happened. Recall that
the plan of the first, failed blast in 1993 was to topple one World Trade Center
tower into the other, bringing both down on surrounding buildings for a possible
total of 200,000 dead. This was the approximate combined total of dead at
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The 1993 terrorists were consciously focused on that
precedent, wanting to inflict nuclear-level damage on the United
States.
The destruction of the World Trade Center raised the possibility
that a rogue state might supply terrorists with a nuclear bomb, or enough
material to make such a bomb. Already, there was an alliance between a state
(Afghanistan) and a terrorist organization. But in the war between Israel and
Hezbollah, we've seen a further step toward the feared pattern. Hezbollah
rockets have already inflicted far more damage and disruption on Israeli
civilians than attacks in any previous Middle Eastern war. That is because
military technology is getting ever cheaper, more advanced, and more available,
and because of a military alliance between a supplying state (Iran) and a
terrorist organization.
So we are already seeing a terrorist-executed
proxy war against the West using advanced technology supplied by a rogue state.
It only remains for a nuclear device to replace the cheap rockets. Iran is
working on that. This is why Europe, led by France, is moving into the American
corner. The internal Islamist terror Europe had hoped to avoid by distancing
itself from the United States is happening anyway. And Europe fears that a
terrorist-supplied Iranian bomb, a nuclear-armed Iranian missile, or an Iranian
attempt to corner the world's oil supply through nuclear blackmail, pose direct
threats to the continent itself.
Iraq
Our attack on Saddam was
the easiest way to create a credible threat of force against Iran and North
Korea, while also cutting out Saddam's own capacity to build or buy (from Korea
and/or the A. Q. Kahn network) his own nuclear weapons. For this reason, it
needed doing. Given the immense dangers faced by the West, and compared to our
sacrifices in World War II and Korea, 3,000 casualties is not an excessive cost
(tragic as these losses are). Yet our domestic divisions, and our inability to
pacify Iraq have largely (although not, I believe, entirely) canceled out the
deterrent message of the invasion.
Without a credible threat of force
(and maybe even with a credible threat), there is simply no way that
negotiations, "grand bargains," or unilateral withdrawals will accomplish
anything. Israel had about as credible a threat as anyone could. Given its foes'
rejection of a reasonable American-brokered deal, Israel tried unilateral
withdrawal instead. Now look what's happened. The depth of the Moslem world's
failure to adjust to modernity, the profundity of its need for scapegoats, the
seeming boundlessness of its willingness to accept the death and destruction of
its own in exchange for the "honor" of "revenge," are difficult for Americans to
acknowledge. Read "A
Middle Way" (by David Warren in the Ottawa Citizen) and you will
see that the Western public is systematically sheltered from the sort of news
that turns people into gloomy hawks.
Wishful Thinking
At
Newsday, typically dovish Middle East Studies professor Fawaz Gerges says,
"Hezbollah has risen to fill a social need." I find Gerges's vision of a
solution in the Middle East utterly naive. He pretends that Hezbollah is not
standing as a proxy for Iran, and acts as though a little bit of forceful
negotiating can prod Hezbollah into disarming, and Israel and its Arab foes into
a comprehensive settlement. But Israel has already made the sort of gestures
that ought to have created momentum for peace. Instead, it's gotten more
attacks, and the persistent calls for its destruction so chillingly described by
David Warren.
On one critical point, however, Gerges is right. If
liberals are lost in wishful thinking about the prospects of negotiated
settlements and nuclear containment, conservatives are naive about the
possibility of ending terror by a decisive military blow. Gerges is right that
Hezbollah is not some finite terror force, but the expression of the will and
aspirations of a massive portion of the Lebanese people. As such, it is unlikely
to be bombed out of existence.
Gerges makes the doves' favorite point:
bombing and war only breed more terrorists. True enough, but only because the
underlying cultural dilemma of Muslim modernity has created a need for
scapegoats. War ought to produce the realization that peaceful compromise is the
way out. Instead it produces the opposite. Gestures for peace fare no better.
Withdraw or attack, the results are the same: more hatred, more terror, more
war. Compromise and settlement have been ruled out from the start by a pervasive
ideology, an ideology that is a product of the underlying inability to reconcile
Islam with modernity.
New
Israel
This means that the entire Western world now stands in
a position roughly analogous to that of Israel: locked in an essentially
permanent struggle with a foe it is impossible either to placate, or to entirely
destroy - a foe who demands our own destruction, and whose problems are so deep
they would not be solved even by victory.
We can leave Iraq, as the
Israelis left Lebanon. But we'll likely be back, there or somewhere else, before
long. Some say our army should wait among the Kurds, striking selectively in the
rest of Iraq, only when al Qaeda returns. That's a plan. Yet its likely to end
up where Israel is in Lebanon, especially if al Qaeda starts kidnapping American
soldiers with cross-border raids into the "Kurdish entity."
Meanwhile,
short of a preemptive war, Iran is bound to get the bomb. No grand bargain or
set of economic sanctions can deter it - especially now that Iran is convinced
of its success in creating havoc for the West, and in consolidating popular
support through its proxy attacks on Western interests. As Ian Bremmer reports
in "What the Israeli-Hezbollah War Means for Iran,"
Iran is convinced
it's winning, while America and Europe are increasingly convinced that a
nuclear-armed Iran would be an intolerable danger to their interests.
"Imagine...how much more dangerous the war in Lebanon would be if Iran had a
nuclear weapon."
Collision
Course
The West is on a collision course with Iran. There will
either be a preemptive war against Iran's nuclear program, or an endless series
of hot-and-cold war crises following Iran's acquisition of a bomb. And an
Iranian bomb means further nuclear proliferation to Egypt and Saudi Arabia, as a
balancing move by the big Sunni states. With all those Islamic bombs floating
around, what are the chances the U.S. will avoid a nuclear terrorist strike over
the long-term?
You don't believe that dovishness and negotiations will
fail? Just wait till President Hillary tries to buy off the Iranians with a
"grand bargain." Just wait till a nuclear Iran is unleashed to make further
mischief. A seemingly futile and endless occupation of Lebanon once split Israel
down the middle, breeding an entire generation of Israeli doves. Now Israel is a
united nation of gloomy hawks, transformed by the repeated failure of every
gesture of peace, and by the reality of their implacable foe. (See "Praying
for Hummus, Getting Hamas.") I'm betting that someday we'll all be gloomy
hawks, too. As for me, I'm already there.
- Stanley
Kurtz is a senior fellow at the Ethics and Public Policy Center.
------------------------------
More Gloom [Stanley
Kurtz]
That panel
discussion on democracy with Michael Rubin, Dan Pipes, Robert Satloff, and
Joshua Muravchik is fascinating. I'm partial to Pipes's democratic gradualism
(as I note today in "Hawkish
Gloom"). But to continue the gloominess, gradualists like Pipes and me have
a problem. Without a ongoing American military presence in the Middle East,
it's tough to operate, much less calibrate, a policy of gradual democratic
transformation. That is the great attraction and advantage of a strategy of
rapid democratization. Quick democratization raises the hope of a quick
American exit. Unfortunately, quick democratization doesn't work.
The panelists all give the Bush administration an A for effort, while also
faulting the administration for poor democratic implementation. I think the
problem is less a lack of knowledge than political pressure. The administration
knows that public support for our presence in the Middle East is time-limited.
So they're trying to push democratization quickly. That leads to the sort of
corner-cutting described by Satloff. This mentality of "hold elections then get
out" has been in place since we first went into Iraq.
Supposedly, 9/11 worked a radical change in the Bush administration,
replacing opposition to nation building with the goal of democratic
transformation. But from the perspective of a democratic gradualist, the
administration is still uncomfortable with the idea of nation building. Real
democratization takes time. "Hold elections and get out" is not a formula for
successful nation building.
On the other hand, neither the American public nor the Bush administration
have the desire for an extended military presence in the Middle East. The truth
is, despite the accusations, neither the American public nor the Bush
administration are imperialists. And precisely because of that, it's tough to
get the time needed for genuine transformation.
So we are running out of good alternatives. Option one is to pretend that
9/11 was an isolated incident (or a hidden internal conspiracy), not the
revelation of a new and serious long-term danger. Many anti-war types prefer
option one. Option two is to acknowledge the danger of mass-scale terrorism
using weapons of mass destruction, but rely on negotiations, economic
incentives, "grand bargains," etc. to solve the problem (the favorite Democratic
solution). In the absence of a credible threat of force (and maybe even then,
given the nature of our terrorist foe), I think option two is doomed. Option
three is to deploy force to preempt one rogue state and frighten others, while
depending on a rapidly-spreading wave of democratization to assure long-term
change, and permit relatively rapid American military withdrawal. Option three
is not working out as planned. Option four is an expanded American military and
a combination of more attacks (eg. a strike on Iran's nuclear facilities) with
an extended and enlarged occupation of Iraq, working real social transformation
and democratization. In the absence of a major new terror strike on the U.S.,
or an Iran on or over the nuclear brink, option four is politically
unsustainable.